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ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PURITY STANDARDS IN BIOTECH LABELING LAWS  
 
Abstract - This paper develops a model of heterogeneous consumer preferences to analyze the 
market and welfare effects of reduced purity standards for non-GM labeled food. Analytical 
results show that purity standards affect the equilibrium prices and quantities of both the GM and 
non-GM products as well as the welfare of the groups involved. A change in purity standards is 
shown to create winners and losers among the consumers as well as among the suppliers of the 
GM and conventional products. 
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Discussions of appropriate regulatory norms for foods derived through modern biotechnology date 
back to the early 1980s. Twenty years later, agreement among key trading countries on what such 
norms should be, remains elusive. Some countries, including the US and Canada, consider biotech 
or genetically modified (GM) foods substantially equivalent to conventional ones and regulate 
them similarly. Others, including the European Union (EU), Japan and Australia scrutinize and 
require mandatory labeling of GM foods. Mandatory labeling of GM foods has added costs to the 
production and trade of agricultural and food products and has restricted market access.  
Not all mandatory labeling laws for biotech foods are “made equal,” however, as they 
differ substantially in their standards. The EU requires mandatory labeling of all food ingredients, 
additives and flavorings in processed foods, animal feeds and feed additives as well as highly 
processed foods such as refined oils, sugars, and starches that contain more than 0.9% biotech 
material. Japan and South Korea have more liberal laws mandating labeling for food products that 
contain over 5% and 2% of GM food ingredients, respectively. Unlike the EU, mandatory 
labeling rules in Korea and Japan have affected only a small part of the market as they explicitly 
exclude animal feeds, highly processed foods and oils from labeling requirements. 
Setting such labeling standards has never been a straightforward process either. Consider 
the EU, for instance. After seeing its food and feed biotech labeling and traceability law take 
effect in April of 2004, European regulators have sought to put the last piece of their regulatory 
framework in place by establishing labeling standards for biotech planting seeds. Yet, the choice   2
of standards has remained contentious. The principal point of discord is the purity thresholds of 
biotech material in conventional seeds. Some interest groups have been calling for lower 
thresholds arguing that they should be set at the level of detectability allowed by testing 
technology, typically 0.1%. Other groups have been advocating higher thresholds that would 
presumably minimize disruptions in the agri-food supply chain, typically 0.5%. The EU 
Commission has been attempting to find the “middle ground” – discussing purity standards 
between 0.3% and 0.5% – with little success. 
At first glance, the differences in these purity standards seem minute and yet they have 
caused strong disagreements, even inside the EU Commission. This is in part, because little is 
known about the relative economic implications of such alternative regulatory standards. What is 
known, however, is that a choice of standards that result in excessive compliance costs could imply 
significant welfare losses that could compromise the relevance of the labeling regulation altogether.  
The objective of this study is to address the issue of GM labeling standards by analyzing 
the market and welfare effects of reduced purity standards for non-GM food products. In 
analyzing the economic effects of purity standards in biotech labeling laws, this paper follows 
Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and explicitly accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences 
towards GM and conventional products expressed in numerous stated consumer preference 
studies around the world. Consumer heterogeneity is a key component of our model and it is 
critical in understanding the coexistence of GM and conventional food when labeling occurs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes consumer 
purchasing decisions and welfare, and identifies the determinants of the equilibrium prices and 
quantities when no GM material is allowable in conventional, non-GM food. The section 
following examines the effects of reduced purity standards for non-GM food on equilibrium 
quantities and prices. The effects of increasing the allowable GM content of non-GM labeled 
food on supplier profits and consumer welfare are analyzed before the final section summarizes 
and concludes the paper.             3
Benchmark Case: Conventional Products are Free of GM Ingredients 
Consumer Characteristics and Behavior 
To capture the varying consumer aversion to GM products reflected in numerous stated consumer 
preference studies in Europe and elsewhere, GM and conventional (non-GM) products are treated 
in this paper as vertically differentiated goods. Specifically, the two products are uniformly quality 
ranked by consumers (i.e., if offered at the same price all consumers would prefer the non-GM 
product), but consumers differ in their valuation of the perceived quality differences (and, thus, 
they differ in their willingness to pay for such quality differences). The GM and conventional 
products considered in this study share the same observable physical characteristics (e.g., 
appearance, taste etc.) while differing in the presence (or absence) of credence GM ingredients. 
Assuming that a consumer spends a small fraction of total expenditure on the goods in 
question, her utility function can be written as:  
 
λα − − = gm gm p U U     if a unit of GM product is consumed, and 
µα − − = ngm ngm p U U     if a unit of non-GM product is consumed  (1) 
 
where  gm U  is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of the GM product, and  ngm U  is the 
utility associated with purchasing one unit of the non-GM version of the product. The price of the 
GM product is  gm p , and the price of its non-GM counterpart is  ngm p . The parameter U is a per 
unit base level of utility while the parameters λ and µ are utility discount factors associated with 
the consumption of the GM and the non-GM products, respectively. The characteristic α differs 
according to consumer and captures heterogeneous consumer preferences for the two products.  
For simplicity of exposition, the characteristic α takes values between zero and one and 
consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed between the polar values of α.
1 In this 
                                                 
1 The implications of relaxing this assumption to allow a concentration of consumers at the ends of the 
spectrum (i.e., zero and one) are straightforward and are discussed throughout the text.   4
context, the terms λα and µα give the discount in utility from consuming the GM product and the 
non-GM product, respectively.
2 To capture the expressed consumer aversion to GM products, λ is 
assumed greater than µ with the difference (λ-µ)α reflecting the divergence in consumer 
valuation of the perceived quality differences between the two products. Put in a different way, 
the difference (λ-µ)α captures the level of aversion to GM products of the consumer with 
differentiating attribute α. Finally, to allow for positive market shares of the two vertically 
differentiated products, we assume that the GM product is priced below its conventional 
counterpart, i.e.,  gm p  ≤ ngm p (see below).  
The consumption choice of an individual consumer is determined by the relationship 
between the utilities derived from the GM and the non-GM products. More specifically, the 





= α ⇒ µα − − = λα − − α
gm ngm
gm gm ngm gm gm gm
p p
p U p U :     (2) 
 
is indifferent between consuming a unit of GM and non-GM product – the utility associated with 
the consumption of these products is the same. Consumers with relatively low aversion to genetic 
modification (i.e., consumers with α∈[0,  gm α )) prefer the GM product, while consumers with 
high aversion to GM products (i.e., consumers with α∈( gm α , 1]) consume the non-GM product.  
When consumers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of α,  gm α  also 
determines the share of the GM product in total consumption,  gm x . The consumption share of the 
non-GM product,  ngm x , is given by 1- gm α . Normalizing the mass of consumers at unity,  gm x  and  
                                                 
2 In this setting, U-λα and U-µα represent the consumer willingness-to-pay (wtp) for a unit of the GM and 
the conventional product, respectively. Subtracting the relevant equilibrium prices from these wtp values 
provides an estimate of the consumer surplus associated with the consumption of these products.   5
ngm x  give the consumer demands for the GM and the non-GM products, respectively. In what 
follows, the terms “consumption share” and “demand” will be used interchangeably to denote 
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From equations (3) and (4) follows that the demand for the GM (non-GM) product falls 
with an increase in its price and/or an increase (decrease) in consumer aversion to GM products, 
and rises as the price of the non-GM (GM) product increases. Obviously, if  gm p  were greater 
than  ngm p , the GM product would be driven out of the market (i.e.,  0 = gm x  and  1 = ngm x ), while 
if the price premium of the non-GM product,  ngm p - gm p , exceeded the level of aversion to GM 
products, λ-µ, for all consumers (∀α), then the GM product would dominate the market (i.e., 
1 = gm x  and  0 = ngm x ).  
Figure 1 graphs the  gm U  and  ngm U  utility curves and depicts the consumption decisions 
under a labeling regime when the non-GM product is free of GM ingredients and both products 
enjoy positive shares of the market.
3 Aggregate consumer welfare is given by the area underneath 








d U d U CW ngm gm . 
 
                                                 
3 When the assumption of a uniform consumer distribution is relaxed, the consumption shares of the two 
products depend on the skewness of the (continuous) distribution – i.e., the more skewed the distribution of 
consumers towards 1, the greater the consumption share of (consumer demand for) the non-GM product.    6
Equilibrium Prices and Quantities 
Given the potential effect of the purity requirements on the segregation and identity preservation 
costs along a supply channel, we are interested in expressing the equilibrium conditions in the 
markets of the GM and conventional products in terms of the relevant costs of production. Figure 
2 graphs the inverse demand curves for the GM and the non-GM products (shown as  gm D  and 
ngm D , respectively) and depicts the equilibrium conditions in the two markets in the familiar 
supply and demand framework of analysis. The inverse demand curves for the two products are 
derived from equations (3) and (4) and are given by: 
 
() gm ngm gm x p p µ − λ − =            ( 5 )  
() ngm gm ngm x p p µ − λ − + µ − λ =         ( 6 )  
 
In the case of constant marginal retail costs depicted in Figure 2, the equilibrium prices 
and quantities can be expressed as: 
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where θ is the conjectural variations elasticity capturing the degree of market power in the retail  
market for the two products,
4 and  gm c  and  ngm c  are the marginal costs faced by the retailers of the  
                                                 
4 The parameter θ takes values between zero and one and captures the degree of retailers’ market power – 
the greater is θ, the greater is the market power in the retail markets for the GM and non-GM products. A 
value of θ equal 1 corresponds to a monopoly while a value of θ equal to 0 reflects a perfectly competitive 
retail market structure.   7
GM and the non-GM products, respectively.
5  
Equations (7)-(10) indicate that the equilibrium prices and quantities depend on the level 
of consumer aversion to GM products, λ-µ, the retail costs  gm c  and  ngm c , and the degree of 
market power in retailing, θ. The greater is λ-µ, and/or the greater are the  gm c  and  ngm c , and/or  
the greater is θ, the greater are the consumer prices of the two products (i.e.,  0 >
λ ∂
∂ gm p
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Similarly, the greater is the consumer aversion to GM products, λ-µ, and/or the smaller is the cost  
difference between the two products,  ngm c - gm c , the smaller is the market share of the GM 
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).   
Regarding the effect of market power on  gm x  and  ngm x , it depends on the level of 
consumer aversion to GM products, λ-µ, relative to the cost difference  ngm c - gm c . In particular, 
when λ-µ is greater (less) than double the cost differential  ngm c - gm c , an increase in market power 
will increase the prices of both the GM and the non-GM product but it will increase the price of 
the non-GM product by more (less). The greater (smaller) increase in  ngm p  results then in 
reduced (increased) demand for the non-GM product and increased (reduced) demand for its GM 

















                                                 
5 The retail costs of the two products reflect (i) the production, processing, and marketing costs along the 
two supply channels, (ii) the costs associated with the segregation and labeling of the two products (with 
the majority of these costs being incurred in the high quality, non-GM supply chain), and (iii) the market 
power at previous stages of the supply chain (i.e., the market power of agricultural input suppliers, food 
manufacturers, wholesalers etc.). The greater are the production, processing and/or marketing costs, and/or 
the greater are the labeling and segregation costs, and/or the greater is the market power upstream a supply 
channel, the greater are the retail costs of a product.   8
Market Effects of Reduced Purity Standards for Non-GM Food 
Consider now the case where the non-GM labeled food is allowed to contain a certain amount of 
GM ingredients. This reduction in the purity standards for non-GM food affects the costs incurred 
in the non-GM supply channel as well as the utility associated with the consumption of the non-
GM product. In particular, a reduction in the purity standards reduces the cost of segregating and 
identity preserving the non-GM product and thus, it reduces  ngm c . In addition, a reduction in 
purity standards increases the utility discount factor associated with the consumption of the non-
GM good, µ, as the latter (i.e., the non-GM product) is now allowed to contain a certain 
percentage of GM ingredients. 








ngm c  is the retail cost of the non-GM product ex post (i.e., after the reduction in the purity 
standards). The greater is the proportion of GM material allowed in the conventional product (i.e., 
the lower are the purity standards), the lower are the costs associated with the segregation and 
identity preservation of this product, the lower is 
'
ngm c , and the greater is τ. 
The utility effect of a reduction in purity standards is given by: 
 
  µ − µ = σ '             ( 1 2 )  
 
where  ' µ  is the utility discount factor associated with the consumption of the non-GM product 
under reduced purity standards. The greater is the GM content of the conventional product, the 
greater is  ' µ , and the greater is σ. 
  The equilibrium conditions under reduced purity standards can be derived by substituting 
'
ngm c  and  ' µ  for  ngm c  and µ, respectively, in equations (7)-(10) and can be written as:   9
 
() [ ] ( )
θ +








p        ( 1 3 )  
 
() ( ) [ ]
θ +

















gm µ − λ θ +
− + µ − λ θ
=
2 1
        ( 1 5 )  
 







ngm µ − λ θ +




       ( 1 6 )  
 
The Effect of Reduced Purity Standards on Equilibrium Prices and Quantities 
Comparing equations (7) and (8) with equations (13) and (14) shows that the cost and utility 
effects of reduced purity standards cause the prices of both the GM and the non-GM products to 
fall.
6 Because of its asymmetric effect on the cost of the two products (i.e., the reduction in purity 
standards reduces  ngm c  while leaving  gm c  unaffected), while the reduction in the purity standards 
reduces both  ngm p  and  gm p , it reduces  ngm p  by relatively more, i.e., 
  
() ( ) ( ) '
gm gm
'
ngm ngm p p p p − =
θ +
τ + θσ θ
>
θ +
τ + θσ θ +
= −
2 1 2 1
1
     ( 1 7 )  
 
Similarly, comparing the equilibrium market shares before and after the reduction in the 
purity standards for the non-GM product shows that the effect of reduced purity standards on the 
equilibrium quantities of the GM and non-GM products depends on the relative magnitude of the 
cost and utility effects (τ and σ, respectively), the relative retail costs of the two products prior to 
the reduction in purity standards (determined by the degree of market power upstream the two 
supply channels and the relative costs of production, processing, marketing, segregation and 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, the reduction in the purity standards reduces  gm p  when θ is greater than zero. When θ 
equals zero,  gm p  is not affected by the purity of the non-GM product.   10
labeling of GM and conventional products), and the level of consumer aversion to GM products, λ-
µ. In general, the greater is τ and/or the smaller is σ and/or the smaller is  ngm c - gm c  and/or the 
greater is λ-µ, the greater is the likelihood that a reduction in purity standards will increase the 
market share of the non-GM product and will reduce the market share of its GM counterpart. In 
particular, comparing equations (9) and (10) with equations (15) and (16) shows that when the ratio 
σ
τ
 is greater (less) than the ratio of the cost differential  ngm c - gm c  over the consumer aversion to 
GM products, λ-µ, the reduction in purity standards increases (decreases) the consumption share of 
the non-GM product and reduces (increases) the consumption share of its GM counterpart, i.e.,  
 
  () ()ngm
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ngm








 and  ( ) gm
'
gm x x > ≤      ( 1 8 )  
 
Graphically, the reduction in the purity standards for the non-GM product causes a 
downward shift of the marginal cost curve in the non-GM market (cost effect) and a reduction in 
the absolute value of the slopes of the demand curves in both the GM and the non-GM product 
markets (utility effect). Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the equilibrium quantities and prices in the two 
markets under the three scenarios depicted in equation (18). The solid and dashed lines show the 
demand and supply relationships before and after the reduction in the purity standards, 
respectively. The dotted and hatched areas in these Figures depict the relevant gains and losses by 
retailers, respectively, as the purity standards for the non-GM product fall. 
The market effects of reduced purity standards can also be shown in the consumer utility 
space depicted in Figure 1. In this setting, the reduced price of the GM product causes an upward 
shift of the  gm U  utility curve, while the reduced price of the non-GM product and the increased µ 
increase the intercept and the (absolute value of the) slope of the  ngm U  utility curve causing the   11





τ gm ngm c c
 and 
reduced purity standards increase the consumption share of the GM product. Figures 7 and 8 
illustrate the other two scenarios depicted in equation (18). 
Our results on the market effects of reduced purity standards are summarized below. 
 
RESULT 1:  A reduction in the purity standards for non-GM labeled food reduces the prices of 
both the conventional (non-GM) and the GM products. 
 
RESULT 2:  The effect of a reduction in the purity standards for non-GM labeled food on the 
equilibrium quantities of the GM and conventional products depends on the relative 
magnitude of the cost and utility effects of reduced purity standards, the level of 
consumer aversion to GM products, and the retail costs of the two products. The 
smaller (greater) the cost reduction in the non-GM supply channel and/or the greater 
(smaller) the reduction in the utility associated with the consumption of the non-GM 
product and/or the smaller (greater) the consumer aversion to GM products and/or 
the greater (smaller) the difference between the costs faced by the retailers of the two 
products prior to the reduction in purity standards, the greater is the likelihood that a 
reduction in purity standards will reduce (increase) the demand for conventional 
product and will increase (reduce) the demand for its GM counterpart. 
 
Welfare Effects of Reduced Purity Standards for Non-GM Food 
The Effect of Reduced Purity Standards on Supplier Profits  
As mentioned previously, the gains and losses of suppliers of GM and conventional products due 
to reduced purity standards are depicted by the dotted and hatched areas in Figures 3-5. 
Mathematically, the profits of GM and conventional product suppliers prior to the reduction in 
purity standards are given by: 
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while the profits of these same suppliers after the reduction in purity standards are: 
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Comparing the profits of the product suppliers before and after the reduction in purity 
standards shows that the effect of such reduction on supplier profits depends on the relative 
magnitude of the cost and utility effects, the level of consumer aversion to GM products, the 
market power present in the retail markets of the two products, and the initial cost difference 
ngm c - gm c  (i.e., the cost difference prior to the reduction in purity standards). 
In particular, comparing equations (19) and (21) shows that when the 
σ
τ
 ratio is greater 
(smaller) than a critical value 
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )( ) [ ]
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The reasoning is as follows. The greater are the cost savings in the non-GM supply chain and/or 
the smaller is the utility effect from reduced purity standards and/or the greater is the consumer 
aversion to GM products and/or the smaller is the initial cost difference  ngm c - gm c , the lower is 
the demand for the GM product under reduced purity standards. The lower is the demand for the   13
GM product and/or the lower is the market power in the retail market of this product, the lower 
the profits that can be earned by this product’s suppliers. 
Similarly, a comparison of equations (20) and (22) reveals that the smaller are the cost 
savings in the non-GM supply chain and/or the greater is the utility effect from reduced purity 
standards and/or the smaller is the consumer aversion to GM products and/or the greater is the 
initial cost difference  ngm c - gm c , and/or the lower is the market power in the retail market of the 
non-GM product, the greater is the likelihood that a reduction in purity standards will result in 
losses for the non-GM product suppliers. In particular, when the 
σ
τ
 ratio is smaller (greater) than a 
critical value given by  ()
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Overall, when the 
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 ratio is relatively small (i.e., when 
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of the GM product gain while suppliers of the non-GM product lose from a reduction in the purity 
standards for non-GM food. For intermediate values of the 
σ
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), both GM and non-GM product suppliers lose from a reduction in purity 
standards. Finally, when the 
σ
τ
 ratio is relatively large (i.e., when 
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τ











suppliers of the non-GM product gain while those of the GM product lose from a reduction in the 
purity standards for non-GM food.  
   14
RESULT 3:  The effect of reduced purity standards for non-GM food on the suppliers of the non-
GM and GM products depends on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility 
effects, the market power of the product suppliers, the level of consumer aversion to 
GM products, and the initial difference in the retail costs of the two products. The 
smaller (greater) the cost savings in the non-GM supply channel and/or the greater 
(smaller) the reduction in consumer valuation of the non-GM product and/or the 
smaller (greater) the consumer aversion to GM products and/or the greater (smaller) 
the initial cost difference  ngm c- gm c , and/or the lower the market power in the retail 
markets of the two products, the greater the likelihood that reduced purity standards 
will result in losses for suppliers of the non-GM (GM) product.  
 
The Effect of Reduced Purity Standards on Consumer Welfare  
In addition to illustrating the market effects of reduced purity standards in the consumer utility 
space, Figures 6-8 can also be used to determine the effects of reduced purity standards for the 
welfare of consumers. The areas marked as G and L represent the consumer welfare gains and 
losses, respectively, that result from a reduction in the purity standards for the non-GM product 
under the different scenarios depicted in equation (18).
7 The mathematical expressions for the 
relevant consumer welfare gains and losses are also presented in these figures.   
The analysis shows that some consumers always gain while others may lose from a 
reduction in the purity standards for the non-GM product. Specifically, consumers with relatively 
low aversion to GM products that find it optimal to consume the GM product both before and 
after a reduction in purity standards gain due to the reduction in  gm p  that results from reduced 
purity standards. Thus, reduced purity standards in the non-GM supply chain create a positive 
externality for consumers of the GM product by reducing  gm p .  
                                                 
7 When the assumption of a uniform consumer distribution is relaxed, the welfare effects of reduced purity 





τ gm ngm c c
, for instance, the 
more skewed the distribution of consumers towards 1, the greater the total consumer welfare losses from 
reduced purity standards.   15
The effect of reduced purity standards on consumers of the non-GM product depends on 
the level of their aversion to GM products. In particular, consumers with intermediate level of 
aversion to GM products gain because the effect of reduced  ngm p  outweighs the effect from the 
increase in the utility discount factor µ, while consumers with high aversion to GM products may 
lose because the utility effect dominates the price effect of reduced purity standards. The greater a 
consumer’s aversion to GM products (i.e., the greater is α), the greater the utility discount from a 
reduction in purity standards, and the greater the likelihood that this consumer will realize a 
welfare loss from a reduction in purity standards for non-GM labeled food.  
Formally, consumers with differentiating attribute  ) , 0 [ w α ∈ α  in Figures 6-8 gain from 
reduced purity standards while consumers with  ] 1 , ( w α ∈ α  realize a welfare loss where:  
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Note that the greater are the cost savings in the non-GM supply channel, τ, and/or the 
smaller is the reduction in consumer valuation of the non-GM product, σ, the greater is the share 
of consumers who benefit from the reduction in purity standards. When  ()
θ +






, the price 
effect of reduced purity standards dominates the utility effect, the utility associated with the 
consumption of the non-GM product increases after the reduction in the purity standards for all 
consumers (i.e.,  ngm
'
ngm U U >  ∀α), and all consumers gain from reduced purity standards. This 
case is depicted in Figure 9.    16
Our results on the effects of reduced purity standards on consumer welfare are 
summarized in Results 4 and 5 below, while Table 1 presents the market and welfare effects of 
reduced purity standards for non-GM labeled food.   
 
RESULT 4:  Consumers of the GM product benefit from a reduction in the purity standards for 
non-GM labeled food due to the reduction in the price of the GM product. 
 
RESULT 5:  The effect of a reduction in purity standards for non-GM products on the consumers 
of these products depends on their aversion to GM products and the relative 
magnitude of the cost and utility effects of reduced standards. For given cost and 
utility effects, the smaller (greater) is the consumer aversion to GM products, the 
smaller (greater) are the welfare losses due to reduced purity standards, and the 
greater (smaller) is the likelihood that the reduced product prices will result in 
consumer welfare gains. When the cost effect is relatively large and/or when the 
utility effect is relatively small, a reduction in purity standards results in welfare 
gains for all consumers.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper develops a model of heterogeneous consumer preferences to analyze the market and 
welfare effects of reduced purity standards for non-GM labeled food. A reduction in the purity 
standards for non-GM food affects both the supply and the demand side of the market – it reduces 
the segregation and identity preservation costs in the conventional supply chain as well as the 
consumer willingness to pay for non-GM food.  
The cost and utility effects of reduced purity standards are shown to reduce the prices of 
both the GM and non-GM products and have an effect on the market shares of these products and 
the welfare of the groups involved. While the reduction in the price of the GM food product 
causes an unambiguous increase in the welfare of consumers of the GM product, the effects of 
reduced purity standards on the market shares of the two products, the welfare of the non-GM 
product consumers, and the profits of the suppliers of GM and non-GM products are shown to be   17
case-specific depending on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects of reduced purity 
standards; the distribution of consumer preferences and the level of aversion to GM products; the 
production, processing, and marketing costs along the GM and conventional supply chains; the 
costs associated with the segregation and labeling of the two products; and the market power 
present in the supply channels of the GM and conventional products. 
In addition to identifying the effect of reduced purity standards on prices, quantities, and 
the welfare of the groups involved, a key result of the paper is that a reduction in purity standards 
creates winners and losers among the consumers as well as among the suppliers of the two 
products. The identity of these winners and losers is determined by the relative cost and utility 
effects of reduced purity standards. For instance, while a reduction in purity standards under a 
relatively low cost effect and a relatively high utility effect results in benefits for suppliers of the 
GM product and consumers with low and moderate aversion to GM products, and losses for 
suppliers of the non-GM product and consumers with relatively high aversion to GM products, the 
same reduction under a high cost effect and a low utility effect has the exact opposite effect for the 
suppliers of the two products and those consumers with relatively high aversion to GM products. 
Since a reduction in purity standards creates winners and losers among the consumers 
and the suppliers of the two products, the regulatory decision on the purity standards of non-GM 
labeled food will be determined by the identity of the potential winners and losers and the relative 
weight placed by the regulator on the welfare of these groups. In this context, the market and 
welfare effects of purity standards are of interest to the government and all the participants in the 
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Figure 2.  Equilibrium conditions when conventional products are free of GM ingredients. 
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Figure 9.  Market and welfare effects of reduced purity standards when  ()
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Table 1.   Market and welfare effects of reduced purity thresholds for non-GM products   
 
Prices Quantities  Retailer 
Profits 
Consumer Welfare 
Ratio of the Cost over the Utility Effect of Reduced Purity Standards ( σ τ ) 
gm p   ngm p   gm x   ngm x   gm π   ngm π   1
gm CS
  2 a
ngm CS
  3 b
ngm CS
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1 
gm CS  is the welfare of consumers that prefer the GM product prior to the reduction in purity standards (i.e., consumers with α∈[0, gm α ] in Figures 1 and 6-9).   
2  a
ngm CS  is the welfare of consumers that prefer the non-GM product prior to the reduction in purity standards and have moderate aversion to GM products (i.e., 
consumers with α∈( gm α ,  w α ] in Figures 6-8).   
3  b
ngm CS  is the welfare of consumers that prefer the non-GM product prior to the reduction in purity standards and have relatively high aversion to GM products (i.e., 
consumers with α∈( w α , 1] in Figures 6-8).  
The colored symbols indicate parameters on which the effect of reduced purity standards changes as the ratio  σ τ  increases.  
 